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Abstract
For several decades there has been no breakthrough in fundamental physics as
revolutionary as relativity and quantum physics despite the amazing advancement
of applied physics and technology. By discussing several examples of what physics
could have achieved by now, but failed, I will argue that the present state of
fundamental physics is not caused by the lack of talented physicists, but rather
by problematic general views on how one should do physics. Although it appears
to be widely believed that such general views cannot affect the advancement of
physics I would like to draw the attention of the younger generation of physicists
to three reasons that might have been responsible for failures in the past and
might cause problems in the future: (i) misconceptions on the nature of physical
theories, (ii) underestimation of the role of conceptual analyses so successfully
employed by Galileo and Einstein, and (iii) overestimation of the predictive power
of mathematics in physics.
In recent years physicists have started to express publicly their concerns that not
everything has been quite fine with the advancement of physics in the last several
decades [1]. Although not all agree with such concerns I think it is an undeniable
fact that in this period there has been no revolutionary breakthrough in fundamental
physics of the type of relativity and quantum physics. A convenient answer might be
that more experimental evidence is required to make a breakthrough possible. But
what if it turns out that all conditions necessary for a new physical theory have already
been present but physicists have been failing to process successfully the existing theo-
retical and experimental evidence? A concise analysis of several missed opportunities
in the twentieth century physics due to what I think are inadequate views on doing
physics seems to suggest that this possibility should be taken seriously.
Physicists generally agree that physics describes and tries to explain the world.
However, this appears to be the only consensus. Physicists’ views on the nature of
physical theories vary widely but I think the views which might prevent physicists
who hold them from arriving at new results are those that regard our theories only as
good descriptions of the world and that insist on not considering the “most successful
abstractions to be real properties of our world” [2] (one can even come across extreme
views that physics tells nothing about the existence of what it describes). I think these
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are unproductive views negatively affecting not only the advancement of physics, but
also the physicists who share them and who often pay a high personal price. Here are
two examples from the history of the twentieth century physics.
It was precisely the view, that successful abstractions should not be regarded as
representing something real, that prevented Lorentz from discovering special relativity.
He believed that the time t of an observer at rest with respect to the aether (which is
a genuine example of reifying an unsuccessful abstraction) was the true time, whereas
the quantity t′ of another observer, moving with respect to the first, was merely an
abstraction that did not represent anything real in the world. Lorentz himself admitted
the failure of his approach [3]:
The chief cause of my failure was my clinging to the idea that the vari-
able t only can be considered as the true time and that my local time t′
must be regarded as no more than an auxiliary mathematical quantity. In
Einstein’s theory, on the contrary, t′ plays the same part as t; if we want
to describe phenomena in terms of x′, y′, z′, t′ we must work with these
variables exactly as we could do with x, y, z, t.
The second example is especially relevant now since this year we celebrate the
one hundredth anniversary of the publication of Minkowski’s paper “Space and time”
in 1909 [4]. A century after Minkowski, for some physicists spacetime is nothing
more than a four-dimensional mathematical space which does not represent a real
four-dimensional world. In a recent Reference Frame N. David Mermin wrote that
“spacetime is an abstract four-dimensional mathematical continuum” [2] and pointed
out that regarding spacetime only as an abstract concept was a good example of not
“inappropriately reifying our successful abstractions” [2]. However, if this were the case
and spacetime were merely a mathematical space with no counterpart in the world, we
would celebrate Poincare´, not Minkowski, because it was Poincare´ who first noticed
(before July 1905) that the Lorentz transformations had a geometric interpretation as
rotations in what he seemed to have regarded as an abstract four-dimensional space
[5, p. 168].
The reason of why Poincare´ failed to develop that idea seems to be even more
complicated than that in the case of Lorentz. Poincare´ appeared to have seen nothing
revolutionary in the idea of a mathematical four-dimensional space since he believed
that our physical theories are only convenient descriptions of the world and therefore
it is really a matter of convenience which theory we would use in a given situation.
Poincare´’s failure to comprehend the profound physical meaning of the principle of
relativity and of the geometric interpretation of the Lorentz transformations is one
of the examples in the history of physics when an inadequate philosophical position
prevents a scientist (even as great as Poincare´) from making a discovery.
This should be specifically stressed because physicists often think that they do
not need any philosophical position for their research. In order to make sure that
inadequate philosophical views do not prevent us (especially young physicists) from
arriving at important new results I think it would be helpful if from time to time we
recall similar cases from the history of science or at least what the philosopher Daniel
Dennett said on this issue: “Scientists sometimes deceive themselves into thinking
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that philosophical ideas are only, at best, decorations or parasitic commentaries on
the hard, objective triumphs of science, and that they themselves are immune to the
confusions that philosophers devote their lives to dissolving. But there is no such thing
as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken
on board without examination” [6].
Had Minkowski believed, like Poincare´, that uniting space and time into a four-
dimensional space was only a convenient mathematical abstraction, he would not have
written a paper whose title and content were devoted to something the main idea of
which had already been published by Poincare´ two years (and probably written three
years) before Minkowski’s talk on space and time given in September 1908, and would
not have begun his paper with the now famous introduction, which unequivocally
announced the revolution in our views on space and time: “Henceforth space by itself,
and time by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of
union of the two will preserve an independent reality” [7, p. xv].
Unlike Poincare´, Minkowski appears to have realized that special relativity, partic-
ularly relativity of simultaneity (which implies the existence of many spaces), would
be impossible in a three-dimensional world. As a three-dimensional space constitutes
a single class of absolutely simultaneous events, if the world were three-dimensional
(i.e., if spacetime were not representing a real four-dimensional world and were just
an abstract mathematical space), there would exist one absolute space and one absolute
class of simultaneous events in contradiction with relativity. If one tends to think that
Minkowski had not done more than Poincare´ on the unification of space and time
and that relativity does not force us to regard the world as four-dimensional, it would
be refreshingly helpful to examine the argument in the italicized sentence (which ap-
pears to have made Minkowski realize the profound physical meaning of relativity of
simultaneity) and to try to demonstrate that the theory of relativity is possible in a
three-dimensional world.
When we take into account that relativity of simultaneity does imply that, hav-
ing different classes of simultaneous events, observers in relative motion have different
spaces, we can better understand why Minkowski noted “neither Einstein nor Lorentz
made any attack on the concept of space” [7, p. xxv] and emphasized that “We would
then have in the world no longer the space, but an infinite number of spaces, analo-
gously as there are in three-dimensional space an infinite number of planes. Three-
dimensional geometry becomes a chapter in four-dimensional physics. You see why I
said at the outset that space and time are to fade away into shadows, and that only
a world in itself will subsist” [7, pp. xxi].
A hundred years ago Minkowski gave us the correct relativistic picture of the world
where the geodesic worldtubes of what we perceive as freely moving three-dimensional
macroscopic bodies are in reality four-dimensional objects, not “abstract geometric
constructions” [2]. That macroscopic physical bodies are real four-dimensional world-
tubes is the essence of Minkowski’s explanation of the deep physical meaning of length
contraction – as shown in Fig. 1 of his paper (the right-hand part of which is repro-
duced in Fig. 1 here) length contraction would be impossible if the worldtubes of the
two Lorentzian electrons, represented by the vertical and the inclined bands in Fig.
1, did not exist and were nothing more than abstract graphical constructions. To see
this more clearly consider only the electron represented by the vertical worldtube. The
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three-dimensional cross-section PP , resulting from the intersection of the electron’s
worldtube and the space of an observer at rest with respect to the electron, is the
electron’s proper length. The three-dimensional cross-section P ′P ′, resulting from the
intersection of the electron’s worldtube and the space of an observer moving with re-
spect to the electron, is the relativistically contracted length of the electron measured
by that observer. Minkowski stressed that “this is the meaning of Lorentz’s hypoth-
esis of the contraction of electrons in motion” [7, p. xxv] and “that the Lorentzian
hypothesis is completely equivalent to the new conception of space and time, which,
indeed, makes the hypothesis much more intelligible” [7, p. xxiii]. The worldtube
of the electron must be real in order that length contraction be possible because,
while measuring the same electron, the two observers in relative motion measure two
three-dimensional electrons represented by the cross-sections PP and P ′P ′ in Fig. 1.
Figure 1: In Minkowski’s paper “Space and Time” Fig. 1, part of which is reproduced
here, represents two Lorentzian electrons by their worldtubes or as Minkowski called
them (world) bands.
This is not so surprising when one takes into account relativity of simultaneity
and the fact that an extended three-dimensional object is defined in terms of simul-
taneity – all parts of the electron taken simultaneously at a given moment. If the
worldtube of the electron were indeed an abstract geometric construction and what
existed was a single three-dimensional electron (a single class of simultaneous events)
represented by the proper cross-section PP , both observers would measure the same
three-dimensional electron, i.e. the same class of simultaneous events in contradiction
with relativity.
1. Missed opportunities due to failing to resolve the issue of the dimen-
sionality of the world according to relativity. One of the main failures of the
twentieth century physics is not taking seriously Minkowski’s arguments for the reality
of spacetime or as he called it perhaps more appropriately “the absolute world.” For
some physicists this is not a failure at all since for them the question of whether or
not spacetime is an abstract concept or represents a real four-dimensional world is not
a physical question since it rather belongs to philosophy. Such a view is worrisome
for several reasons. First, I wonder how many physicists would subscribe to this view
if directly asked whether the dimensionality of the world is a philosophical question
(especially now when physicists freely talk about multidimensional spaces and the
multiverse). Second, I think such a view deprives physicists from arriving at a deeper
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understanding of what relativity is telling us about the world. Third, this particular
view has been responsible for not arriving at some important results as I intend to
show here.
1.1. Dimensionality of the world and inertia. Inertia has been an open question
for centuries and a golden opportunity to finally start resolving it in the twentieth
century has been omitted because of an inadequate (and therefore unproductive) view
on the nature of physical theories, namely the view that spacetime and worldtubes are
theoretical constructions that do not represent anything real.
If Minkowski’s explanation of length contraction is carefully examined, understood,
and adopted, it becomes clear that this relativistic effect would be impossible if the
worldtube of the contracted body did not exist. Then, when the reality of the world-
tube of an accelerating body is taken into account, one can easily link two facts: (i)
the body resists its acceleration, and (ii) the worldtube of the accelerating body is de-
formed (not geodesic). As a real four-dimensional worldtube should resist its (static)
deformation (like any deformed three-dimensional rod) it is natural to ask whether
inertia originates from the four-dimensional stress arising in the statically deformed
worldtube.
Calculations (i) in terms of the four-dimensional stress tensor, (ii) in the case of
the classical electron, and (iii) a semi-classical calculation in quantum field theory, all
appear to show that the static restoring force “arising” in the deformed worldtube
of an accelerating body has the form of the inertial force [8, Chap. 9]. In the case
of a body at rest on the Earth’s surface its deformed worldtube gives rise to a static
restoring force that is precisely F = mg. So taking into consideration the reality of
worldtubes of macroscopic physical bodies implies that the equivalence of inertial and
gravitational forces and masses may be explained by four-dimensional stresses arising
in the deformed worldtubes of non-inertial bodies (i.e. in the worldtubes that are
deviated from their geodesic shape). The worldtube of a body falling in a gravitational
field is geodesic (not deformed) and the body does not resist its fall.
Minkowski would be thrilled to examine the possibility that inertia may be another
manifestation of the four-dimensionality of the world, in addition to the kinematic
relativistic effects, which he believed were such manifestations.
In fact, I think there were two other failures to initiate the assault on the origin
of inertia in the twentieth century. Those missed opportunities had been caused, in
my view, mostly due to underestimation of the role of conceptual analyses in physics.
Since regarding inertia as originating from a four-dimensional stress that arises in the
deformed worldtubes of non-inertial macroscopic bodies provides only a phenomeno-
logical picture of what causes a body to resist its acceleration, the next question will
be to reveal what gives rise to the four-dimensional stress. As the three-dimensional
stress in a deformed three-dimensional rod is caused by electromagnetic forces acting
on the atoms of the deformed rod that are deviated from their equilibrium positions, it
is natural to search for a similar mechanism in the case of the four-dimensional stress.
The first attempt to explain the origin of inertia, that could be regarded as a
candidate for such a mechanism, started on its own long before Minkowski. In 1881
Thomson [9] first realized that a charged particle was more resistant to being acceler-
ated than an otherwise identical neutral particle and conjectured that inertia can be
reduced to electromagnetism. This conjecture had been developed in the framework
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of the classical electron theory into what is now known as the classical electromagnetic
mass theory of the electron (for details see [10, 11, 12]). In this theory inertia is re-
garded as originating from the interaction of the electron with its own electromagnetic
field.
The electromagnetic mass theory of inertia correctly predicts the experimental
fact that at least part of the inertia and inertial mass of every charged particle is
electromagnetic in origin. As Feynman put it: “There is definite experimental evidence
of the existence of electromagnetic inertia – there is evidence that some of the mass
of charged particles is electromagnetic in origin” [13]. And despite the fact that, at
the beginning of the twentieth century, many physicists recognized “the tremendous
importance which the concept of electromagnetic mass possesses for all of physics”
[14], it has been inexplicably abandoned after the advent of relativity and quantum
mechanics. And that happened even though the classical electron theory predicted
that the electromagnetic mass increases with increasing velocity before the theory
of relativity, yielding the correct velocity dependence, and that the relation between
energy and mass is E = mc2 [13, pp. 28-3, 28-4] (in fact, the relationship between
mass and energy contained a factor of 4/3, which prompted Feynman to write ”It is
therefore impossible to get all the mass to be electromagnetic in the way we hoped.
It is not a legal theory if we have nothing but electrodynamics” [13, p. 28-4]; but he
was unaware that the factor of 4/3 had already been accounted for [10]).
In my view, there had been no justification for abandoning the classical electron
theory without a thorough analysis of how it made the predictions mentioned in the
above paragraph and especially its major prediction of the electromagnetic mass of
charged particles. A completely wrong theory cannot make so many correct pre-
dictions. Today “the state of the classical electron theory reminds one of a house
under construction that was abandoned by its workmen upon receiving news of an
approaching plague. The plague in this case, of course, was quantum theory. As
a result, classical electron theory stands with many interesting unsolved or partially
solved problems” [15, p. 213].
The other failure to start dealing with the open question of inertia is caused, I
think, again by underestimation of the role of conceptual analyses in physics. Accord-
ing to the Standard Model the fundamental interactions are mediated by the exchange
of virtual quanta. However, a rigorous conceptual analysis of how exactly the exchange
of virtual quanta gives rise to the electromagnetic forces, for example, appears to have
never been carried out. Having a detailed description of the mechanism of interac-
tion between particles in the Standard Model would have made it possible to examine
whether it can provide an explanation of the origin of inertia. Indeed, if the electro-
magnetic force between two charges, for instance, can be fully understood in terms of
the recoils to which a charge is subjected when emitting and absorbing virtual photons,
then one can expect that inertia might be explained by the Standard Model.
How the recoils from virtual photons absorbed by an elementary charge cause
its inertia can be demonstrated by considering a free charge. The recoils it suffers
due to the emission and absorption of the virtual photons of its own (quantized)
electromagnetic field cancel out precisely due to the spherical symmetry of the field.
However, taking into account the general-relativistic frequency shift of the incoming
virtual photons that are absorbed by a non-inertial charge (accelerated or supported
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in a gravitational field) implies that the recoils imparted on the charge by the absorbed
(“blue” and “red” shifted) virtual photons of its own field do not cancel out. That
imbalance in the recoils gives rise to a self-force which is electromagnetic in origin and
which acts on the non-inertial charge [8, Chap. 9]. As a result the charge resists its
acceleration or its being prevented from falling in a gravitational field. In other words,
the non-inertial charge resists its deviation from its geodesic path, which implies that
the self-force manifest itself as an electromagnetic component of the inertial force.
As according to the Standard Model the strong and weak interactions are likewise
mediated by virtual quanta it follows that a non-inertial elementary particle that is
involved in weak and strong interactions will be also subjected to the imbalanced recoils
from the virtual quanta of its own strong and weak “fields”, which are absorbed by the
non-inertial particle. This mechanism implies that all interactions in the framework of
the Standard Model contribute to the inertia and mass of elementary particles. That
contribution might either complement the Higgs mechanism or provide an alternative
mechanism.
It should be emphasized that the same mechanism that accounts for inertia and
mass of the classical electron – the interaction of the electron charge with its own
field – appears to be at work at the quantum level as well. This would explain why
the electron theory correctly predicted the existence of electromagnetic inertia and
would demonstrate that if the electron theory had not been prematurely abandoned
its careful examination would have naturally led to the mechanism that gives rise to
inertia and mass at the quantum level.
1.2. Worldtubes and anisotropic velocity of light in non-inertial reference frames.
The missed opportunity to have a complete understanding of propagation of light in
non-inertial reference frames is another example of underestimation of the power of
conceptual analysis and not taking seriously Minkowski’s view that physical objects
are worldtubes in spacetime. Try to recall how many books on relativity define av-
erage anisotropic velocity of light in accelerating frames or in a gravitational field.
Of course, the Sagnac effect and the time delay (Shapiro) effect, for example, are
nicely discussed but they have never been explained properly in terms of the average
anisotropic velocity of light.
Although deriving the expression for the average anisotropic velocity of light is
straightforward [8, Chap. 7] realizing the need for such a velocity requires just a little
trust in conceptual analyses – the type of analyses that made Galileo and Einstein,
for instance, such great scientists.
This can be demonstrated by considering the famous example of Einstein’s ele-
vators – accelerating or at rest in a gravitational field. We will do it for the case
of an accelerating elevator; the same analysis applies for an elevator supported in a
gravitational field. Fig. 2 depicts an elevator which accelerates with an acceleration a.
Two light rays emitted from A and C toward the middle point of the elevator B are
introduced (in addition to the original horizontal light ray) in order to demonstrate
that the average velocity of light in an accelerating frame is not c (but the local ve-
locity is, of course, c). The three light rays are emitted simultaneously in the elevator
from points D, A, and C toward point B. Let I be an inertial reference frame in-
stantaneously at rest with respect to the elevator (i.e., the instantaneously comoving
frame) at the moment the light rays are emitted. As I and the non-inertial frame N
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Figure 2: Propagation of light in an accelerating Einstein elevator.
of the elevator share a common instantaneous three-dimensional space and therefore
common simultaneity at the moment the three light signals are emitted, the emission
of the rays is simultaneous in N as well as in I. At the next moment an observer
in I sees that the three light rays arrive simultaneously not at point B, but at B′,
since for the time t = l/c the light rays travel toward B, the elevator moves a distance
δ = at2/2 = al2/2c2. As the simultaneous arrival of the three rays at point B′ as
viewed in I is an absolute fact due to its being a single event, it follows that the rays
arrive simultaneously at B′ as seen in N as well. Since for the same coordinate time
t = l/c in N , the three light rays travel different distances DB′ ≈ l, AB′ = l+ δ, and
CB′ = l − δ, before arriving simultaneously at point B′, an observer in the elevator
concludes that the propagation of light is affected by the elevator’s acceleration. As
seen in Fig. 2 an observer in N concludes (to within terms ∼ c−2) that the average
velocities of the light rays propagating from A to B′ and from C to B′ are slightly
greater and smaller than c, respectively.
AB'C B
a
z
Figure 3: The simultaneous arrival of the vertical light rays at point B′ in Fig. 2
is self-evident when it is taken into account that the points A, B, C, and B′ are
worldlines, which are curved.
One can arrive at the idea that the average velocity of light in non-inertial frames is
not c also by taking into account that the light rays and the points A, B, C, and B′ are
in reality worldlines in spacetime. It is clearly seen in Fig. 3 that the light rays emitted
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from A and C arrive simultaneously at B′, not at B, due the fact that the worldlines
of the points A, B, C, and B′ are curved. When the curvature of the worldtubes of
the emitter and the receiver in the gravitational redshift (Pound–Rebka) experiment
is taken into account one can easily overcome a widely shared misconception – that
the redshift effect proves the curvature of spacetime [16]. What it proves is that the
worldtubes of the emitter and the receiver are curved (not geodesic).
Overlooking the introduction of an average velocity of light in non-inertial frames
has led to another missed opportunity – a derivation of an anisotropic volume element,
which is necessary for calculating electromagnetic phenomena directly in such frames.
Using the anisotropic volume element in those calculations simultaneously solved two
old problems – the appearance of (i) a factor of 1/2 in Fermi’s potential of a charge in
a gravitational field, and (ii) a factor of 4/3 in the expression of the self-force acting
on a non-inertial classical electron [8, Chap. 8].
1.3. Worldtubes and the discovery of general relativity. This section is specifically
devoted to the young generation of physicists. It is sometimes claimed that future
researchers cannot be taught how to make discoveries since discoveries are logical jumps
coming as sudden insights to individual researchers. Often general relativity is given
as an excellent example. Moreover, Einstein himself described the realization that a
person falling from the roof of a house does not feel the force of gravity as the happiest
thought in his life. Such insights do exist in the history of science but not all advances
in science follow that pattern – it is sufficient to mention how conceptual analyses
helped Galileo to arrive at the idea of inertial motion (by disproving Aristotle’s view
of motion) and at his principle of relativity. Even Einstein himself convincingly proved
that conceptual analyses are physics at its best by his thought experiments.
General relativity is indeed an excellent example but not of the view that discov-
eries are results of happy insights; it is an example of making discoveries by having
a productive view on the nature of physical theories and by employing a rigorous
conceptual analysis of the available theoretical and experimental evidence.
Minkowski’s representation of special relativity makes it possible to arrive at the
idea of gravity as a manifestation of the non-Euclidean geometry of spacetime not just
naturally, but inescapably. A conceptual analysis of Newton’s gravitational theory
could and should have revealed, long before Einstein realized it, that a falling body
offers no resistance to its acceleration. This means that the body is not subjected
to any gravitational force, which would be necessary if the body resisted its fall.
Therefore, the falling body moves non-resistantly, by inertia. But how could that be
since it accelerates?
Taking seriously the existence of worldtubes and its implication that inertia origi-
nates from a four-dimensional stress that arises in the deformed worldtube of a non-
inertial body provide a radical resolution – the worldtube of the falling body should be
curved (reflecting the fact that the body accelerates), but not deformed (accounting
for the fact that the body does not resist its acceleration). Such a worldtube can exist
only in a curved spacetime where the geodesic worldtubes of bodies moving by inertia
(non-resistantly) are curved but not deformed.
2. The major missed opportunity in quantum physics. No one knows what
the quantum object is. What is worse is that the standard interpretation of quantum
mechanics tells us that we cannot say or even ask anything about the quantum ob-
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ject between measurements. In this sense, I think, Einstein was right that quantum
mechanics is essentially incomplete. It is unrealistic to assume that an electron, for
example, does not exist between measurements. But if it exists, it is something and
we should know what that something is. In general, we should try to understand what
the (free or interacting) quantum object is.
Although relativity does not fully apply at the quantum level since its equations
of motion manifestly fail to describe the behaviour of quantum objects, spacetime
does seem to be the arena of the quantum world as well. Then the question is: “Are
quantum objects also worldlines in spacetime?” It is well known that the answer is
negative.
This can be demonstrated in the case of interference experiments performed with
single electrons [17]. In such double–slit experiments accumulation of successive single
electron hits on the screen builds up the interference pattern that demonstrates the
wave behaviour of single electrons. When looking at the screen, every single electron
is detected as a localized entity and the natural question is whether the electron was
such an entity before it hit the screen. Our intuition leads us to assume that if the
electron hits the screen as a localized entity, it is such an entity at every moment of
time, which implies that the electron exists continuously in time as a localized entity.
But if this were the case, every single electron would behave as an ordinary particle
and should go only through one slit and no interference pattern would be observed
on the screen. Therefore, the electron cannot be a localized entity at all moments of
time, i.e. it cannot be a worldline in spacetime.
If this had been realized (and it could have been realized if more trust had been put
in conceptual analyses), it could not have been so difficult to ask whether an electron
exists continuously in time if it is not a worldline. Such a question could have provided
a new perspective at looking at quantum phenomena and apparent paradoxes.
3. Possible missed opportunities to test string theory. I think string theory
is perhaps the best example of overestimation of the predictive power of mathematics
in physics. String theory constitutes an unprecedent case in the history of physics
– while string theorists all admit that the theory has not yet been experimentally
confirmed they behave as if this has already been done (or will certainly be done) and
string theory has been treated on equal footing with the accepted physical theories.
A necessary condition that should be met by any newly proposed physical theory
is not contradicting the existing reliable theoretical and experimental evidence. It
is precisely here where I think opportunities to test string theory might have been
missed. Let me give just one example. While string theory has extensively studied
how the interactions in the hydrogen atom can be represented in terms of the string
formalism, I wonder how string theory would answer a much simpler question – what
should be the electron in the ground state of the hydrogen atom in order that the
hydrogen atom does not possess a dipole moment in that state?
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